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a b s t r a c t
This paper analyzes the transition of Brazilian agriculture from low productivity and backwardness to its
current status as amajor player in internationalmarkets. Long-term investment in local agricultural tech-
nology was a crucial determinant of this transformation, but the impact of agricultural policy along this
path was highly convoluted, often causing more distortions than progress. We highlight the importance
of the underlying institutional setting on the impact of agricultural policy. The remarkable transforma-
tion in Brazilian agriculture only really emerged when inclusive and sustainable institutions created a
ﬁscal, monetary and political environment in which those policies could succeed.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
For much of its history Brazil was believed to have a predomi-
nantly agricultural vocation. Itsmassive landarea, suitable climates
andwater availabilitymade the country one of themajor producers
of several agricultural commodities over extensive periods of time.
Yet, its agriculture has traditionally been recognized as backward
and inefﬁcient, marred by low productivity andwasteful and prim-
itive practices. As Brazil industrialized after the 1930s, the notion
of an agricultural vocation was set aside and the sector assumed a
distinctively subsidiary role in the nation’s policy agenda. Its task
became that of supporting the industrialization effort through the
production of inputs and foodstuffs as well as the generation of
foreign currency. Since the 1960s, the low productivity of tradi-
tional agriculture, together with the sector’s resistance to political
and technological change, was diagnosed as a major impedi-
ment for the country’s economic growth and development (Baer,
Kerstenetzky, & Villela, 1973; Graziano da Silva, 1982; Homem de
Melo, 1979; Mueller, 1983). During the decades that followed the
government actively intervened through myriad programs and
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reforms. Although these did manage to create a modern agricul-
tural sector in some areas and for some products, this was only
a partial success, as many problems remained unaddressed and
new ones were created by those very policies (Binswanger, 1991;
Brandão, 1988). By the end of the 1990s productivity had increased,
but only modestly and although there were conﬂicting diagnoses
and policy recommendations, there was consensus that the sector
was highly dysfunctional and in need of further and deeper
reform.
In the ensuing years, and after decades of disappointing results
from erratic agricultural policy, the sector unexpectedly started to
showsignsofprogress. By theendof theﬁrst decadeof thenewcen-
tury Brazil found that, against all odds, it had turned into one of the
breadbaskets of the world. Not only did it produce and export sig-
niﬁcant proportions of severalmajor agricultural commodities, but
this time this was done through highly productive technology and
efﬁcient use of inputs and resources (Gasques, Bastos, Constanza,
& Bacchi, 2012). The endemic backwardness and archaic nature
of Brazilian agriculture had undergone a remarkable and largely
unforeseen transformation, as it achieved the highest growth of
total factor productivity in agriculture among all countries in the
world (we provide detailed data below).
As the world went through a long period of fast growing com-
modity prices culminating in two episodes of food price crises in
2007–2008 and 2010–2011, interest piqued in understanding how
Brazil had achieved this spectacular agricultural transformation.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2016.07.012
1062-9769/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Increasing output, as Brazil had done, primarily through higher
total factor productivity rather than the incorporation of new land
and more labor, seems to be exactly what is needed to feed an
increasing and more prosperous world population, with its greater
demand for food, fuel andmeat, under the increasingly constraining
prospects of a crowdedworld and climate change. In particular, this
interest centered on the fact that the transformation was achieved
starting from a relatively backward agricultural setting, similar to
that found in many other poor and developing countries. Whereas
many technological and organizational packages from developed
countries have been tried throughout the world, the results have
oftenbeendisappointing. TheBrazilian example sparked thenotion
that south-south cooperation in agriculture could fare better, given
the similarities involved and a purported lack of colonial ves-
tiges (Economist, 2010). The fact that the changes in Brazilian
agriculture were achieved simultaneously, though not necessar-
ily causally, with a signiﬁcant and unprecedented drop in poverty
and inequality since 1995, made the lure of the Brazilian break-
through even more enticing for poor countries. Consideration
was given to whether the Brazilian model would be particularly
well suited for Africa. Given that Africa holds much of the last
remaining unused agricultural land in the world, Brazil’s experi-
ence in turning its large savannah regions from barren wastelands
(from the agricultural perspective) into an area that has achieved
world class yields and total production levels, is particularly
relevant.
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the virtuous evolu-
tion of Brazilian agriculture in the past 15 years cannot be traced
back to speciﬁc polices, which could then be replicated elsewhere,
but rather to the more general institutional environment which
arose since the mid-1990s creating circumstances where the gov-
ernment simultaneously reduced its interference in agriculture and
provided the backdrop of rule of law and greater predictability,
where the private sector felt secure and able to invest and pro-
duce (Alston, Melo, Mueller, & Pereira, 2016). Agriculture, perhaps
more so than other sectors, requires government policy to address
market failures. But in an industrializing and urbanizing emerg-
ing economy agricultural objectives often clash with other policy
objectives. Similarly, when a country’s general macroeconomic sit-
uation is fragile, policymakers will often be tempted to use the
agricultural sector to pursue other objectives such as controlling
inﬂation or generating foreign exchange, in the process introduc-
ing policy reversals and inefﬁciencies in the sector. The Brazilian
experience shows that the unprecedented cycle of investment and
growth in agriculture only tookplace once the country stabilized its
economy in the mid-1990s and put in place a series of more open
and predictable political and economic institutional arrangements
(Alves & Pastore, 1978; Brandão & Carvalho, 1991; Helfand, 1999;
Rezende, 2003). In these new circumstances there was less need
for direct policy intervention in areas such as credit and price man-
agement, freeing up policymakers to concentrate on research and
other market failures, thus allowing the sector greater freedom to
invest and grow (Mueller, 2009).
Especially since the early 1970s there was a strong emphasis on
agricultural research with the objective of producing knowledge,
technologies and varieties suited to Brazil’s speciﬁc biomes and
climates. This effort has been centered in EMBRAPA – the Brazil-
ian Enterprise for Agricultural Research – created in 1973 by the
Ministry of Agriculture, which is at the center of National System
of Agricultural Research, a network that includes several state-
level research units, universities and a group of federal and state
ﬁnancing agencies (Avila, Romano, & Garagorry, 2010; Rodrigues,
Buschinelli, & Avila, 2010). This research has been a major deter-
minant of the remarkable increases in productivity in Brazilian
agriculture, as well as the main factor enabling the massive expan-
sion of the agricultural frontier from the traditional areas to the
central savannahs (cerrado), greatly expanding total production
and diversiﬁcation.
Though the importance of investment in country-speciﬁc agri-
cultural technology is a major lesson from the Brazilian success in
agriculture, here too the importance of stable and open institutions
and the resulting macroeconomic and political stability are key
preconditions. It was only after the stabilization of the mid-1990s
that the two decades of investment in agricultural research really
started to payoff. In the previous period even EMBRAPA and its part-
ners suffered frompolicy reversals, uncertainty andwaste (Pastore,
Dias, & Castro, 1976). During most of that time the importance of
this research and knowledge was not widely recognized, and to
most EMBRAPA was just another obscure government bureaucracy.
The support for EMBRAPA and the recognition of thewisdomof hav-
ingpursed the long-term investment in researchonly reallybecame
widespread after the fact, in the 2000s.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we start by
showing some stylized facts and data that document the recent
transformation in Brazil’s agriculture. We show that in terms
of outcomes, this experience is truly remarkable and actually
deserves to be considered as a template for other counties. Section
3 then provides evidence that the evolution of Brazilian agricul-
ture from backwardness to high productivity was not smooth and
preordained, but rather a convoluted process subject to reversals,
unintended consequences and waste. Section 4 shows that this
erratic process was in large measure caused by conﬂicting pol-
icy objectives that undermined agricultural policy that sought to
reduce but, with the interference, often ended exacerbating mar-
ket failures. Theﬁnal section concludesby consideringwhat lessons
can be derived from the Brazilian experience as a model for other
countries.
2. The transformation in Brazilian agriculture
The previous section alluded to a ‘transformation’ that Brazilian
agriculture has undergone in recent years. But most countries tend
to experience improvements over time in their capacity to produce
more and better agricultural products with less input, as technol-
ogy, capital and experience disseminate and accumulate over time.
So what is so remarkable about the Brazilian experience? In this
section we provide evidence and data supporting the view that
Brazil has undergone a distinctively exceptional transition from
being a low productivity producer of a few basic commodities into
a major front-runner both in terms of volume, diversity and pro-
ductivity. We do not aim to provide a comprehensive account of
the state that Brazilian agriculture, but simply to establish the fact
that its experience has been exceptional andmerits attention. Here,
we describe the main achievements, leaving an assessment of how
these results emerged to later sections.
Perhaps the single most compelling evidence of Brazil’s agri-
cultural success relative to that of other countries is the evolution
of total factor productivity.1 Fig. 1 shows that for a select group
of countries Brazil has the highest increase in TFP. The data is
normalized to 1961=100, so the curves show each country’s TFP
growth relative to the level in that country at that year. Both China
and Brazil exhibit very strong productivity growth over the period,
with an upward inﬂexion around 2000 allowing Brazil to surpass
the Chinese by a signiﬁcant margin. Surprisingly both Brazil and
China achieved higher rates of TFP growth than the US since the
early 1990s, despite that country’s availability of technology and
1 Total factor productivity is the growth in output that is not directly due to
the increase in capital, labor and land. As such, it is usually assumed to be due
to innovations and technical progress that allow more efﬁcient use of traditional
inputs.
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Fig. 1. Total factor productivity in agriculture for selected countries 1961–2010.
Source: USDA (2013).
infrastructure. This indicates that whereas the US has already
realized most of the currently available margins for productivity
growth, Brazil and China still have room for improvement. The
ﬁgure also shows that the evolution of TFP in other South American
countries and especially in Sub-Saharan Africa was dramatically
weaker than in Brazil, suggesting that theremight in fact be lessons
from the Brazilian experience for these countries.
Today Brazil is one of the top producers of a long list of products,
including sugar, orange juice, soybeans, coffee, chicken, beef, pork,
maize and cotton. Table 1 showshow its participationhas increased
dramatically in world markets by listing its percentage of world
productionand its rank for the top10productsbyvalue in theworld
in 1990 and in 2011. Brazil remained the largest producer of sugar
cane in 1990 and in 2011, but its share of total world production
increased from 25% to 42%. Also, while in 1990 it was one of the
top 5 producers of only 4 products, this list increased to 7 products
in 2011. As regards livestock, Brazil went from being the 3rd, 3rd
and 13th, producer of cattle, chicken and pork in 1990, to being
2nd, 3rd and 5th in 2011. More importantly, its share in each of
these products increased from 8%, 7% and 2%, to 14%, 13% and 3%.
These increases are all the more impressive when one considers
that during this period most other countries were also increasing
their levels ofproduction so that anygain is relative to this generally
improved performance.
3. Uncertainty in planning and managing Brazilian
agriculture
In the Introduction we argued that the evolution of Brazilian
agriculture frombackwardness to the current levels of highproduc-
tivity and diversiﬁcation was not a smooth preordained process,
but rather one mired in misconceptions, reversals and unintended
consequences. The purpose of this section is to substantiate this
claimwitha seriesof illustrationsandexamples fromBrazil’s recent
agricultural history where policies, programs and interventions
deﬁed the intent of their formulators, leading to unintended conse-
quences and sometimes even having the exact opposite effect than
that which was sought. The examples will be described brieﬂy due
to space limitations. They necessarily involve our own interpreta-
tion of events that are by nature controversial. The point is not to
Table 1
Brazil’s rank in the Top 10 Products Globally by Value: 1990 and 2011.
Year Commodity (top ten by value) Brazilian production (Int $1000) % of world production (value) Rank
2011 Rice (paddy) 3,704,682 2 9
2011 Milk 9,915,772 5 4
2011 Meat, cattle 24,637,781 14 2
2011 Meat, pig 5,179,187 3 5
2011 Meat, chicken 16,346,908 13 3
2011 Wheat – 0 >20
2011 Soybeans 20,082,317 30 2
2011 Tomatoes 1,632,236 3 8
2011 Sugar cane 23,879,265 42 1
2011 Maize 2,753,011 5 3
1990 Meat cattle 11,071,095 8 3
1990 Milk 4,613,538 3 8
1990 Rice (paddy) 1,978,453 1 11
1990 Meat, pig 1,614,064 2 13
1990 Wheat 460,456 1 >20
1990 Meat, chicken 3,355,988 7 3
1990 Grapes 460,023 1 19
1990 Sugar cane 8,349,600 25 1
1990 Potatoes – 0 >20
1990 Eggs 1,020,481 4 5
Source: FAOSTAT (2014) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome http://faostat.fao.org.
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Table 2
Gross income per farm by farms size (2006).
Brackets (in min. wages) Number of farms % Gross income % Gross income per farm
0–2 2,904,769 66.01 3.27 0.52
2–10 995,750 22.63 10.28 4.66
10–200 472,702 10.74 35.46 34.49
>200 27,306 0.62 51.19 861.91
Total 4,400,527 100 100 10.45
Source: Alves and Rocha (2010) using IBGE data, cited in Navarro and Campos (2013, p. 15)
provide a deﬁnitive account of each case, but rather to underscore
Brazil’s erratic path to becoming a major agricultural power. The
subsequent sectionwill then describe howmany of these problems
can be traced to conﬂicting policy objectives, such as macroecono-
mic stabilization or social policy, that, in an environment of weak
institutions undermined or distorted agricultural policy.
A ﬁrst example involves the highly concentrated nature of land
and production in Brazilian agriculture. This has been recognized
as a problem that should be addressed through policy at least as
early as 1946 when a new Constitution explicitly spelt out the
need and the rules for land reform. Since then to the present day
redistributive land reform has been a prominent part of all govern-
ments’ programs, including those in the military period that saw it
as a means to combat traditional rural elites’ obstruction of efforts
to modernize agriculture. Yet all the efforts to reverse the concen-
tration of land systematically ﬂoundered. Rezende (2006) posits
that the current pattern of agriculture was crucially determined by
policies instituted in the 1960s, whose objectives were precisely
the opposite of what effectively emerged. The Rural Labor Statute
of 1963, the Land Statute of 1964 and much subsequent legislation
were motivated by a desire to protect small farmers, rural laborers
and landless peasants from exploitation and oppression given the
unequal nature of their power vis-à-vis large landowners. This
highly pro-worker legislation set the rules promoting redistribu-
tive land reform and extended to the rural sector labor beneﬁts
alreadyheldbyurbanworkers, suchasholidays and the13th salary.
De Janvry and Sadoulet (1989) argue that the unintended effect
of land reform legislation in much of Latin America in the 1960s
was to push some large landowners to become productive so as to
preempt losing the land,whichwas often accomplished by evicting
tenants and substituting workers for mechanization. At the same
time the government started to provide highly subsidized credit for
mechanization in an effort to increase productivity. The result was
that despite this being a country where labor was abundant and
capital scarce, factor prices got distorted, signaling cheap capital
and expensive labor. This induced the adoption of a pattern of
technology and organization of production leading to large mech-
anized agriculture failing to absorb much labor (Hayami & Ruttan,
1985).
The way land reform has been implemented is another example
of how difﬁcult this policy area is to correctly diagnose manage in
Brazil. Although land reform efforts achieved few results until the
early 1990s, since thenmuch landhasbeen redistributed from large
unproductive holdings (as well as much public land) to landless
peasants. This change took place once landless peasants became
effectively organized. They exploited land reform provisions in the
1988Constitution to devise a successful strategy of land invasion as
a means to pressure the government to redistribute unproductive
land (Alston, Libecap, & Mueller, 2000). By 2013 an area equivalent
to France, Portugal, Ireland andAustria hadbeen transferred to over
onemillion families that represent approximately fourmillion land
reform beneﬁciaries.2
2 For data on land reform in Brazil see http://www.incra.gov.br/reforma-agraria/
questao-agraria/reforma-agraria.
Surely that sounds like a successful and impactful land reform.
But on closer inspection it can be seen that although much effort
and resources were put into the land reform programs, the actual
results were quite disappointing. Because land reform is such a
controversial and politically charged issue in Brazil, the debate
between the Landless Peasants’Movement (MST), farmers and gov-
ernmenthas systematically beenkept in the limelight by themedia.
But this debate has almost exclusively centered round a single and
imperfect metric of whether and how much land reform was being
done: the number of families settled by the government. As it was
the gauge of whether the government was or was not fulﬁlling its
campaign promises, the incentives generated were for the govern-
ment to put all its efforts into obtaining land and transferring it to
beneﬁciaries and to skimp on efforts to make sure they were able
to become independent and productive (Alston, Libecap, &Mueller,
2010). In order to reach the ambitious targets government resorted,
for example, to redistributing distant and low quality land to poor
but agriculturally inept beneﬁciaries, many of whom eventually
sold or abandoned their plots. On the surface, a huge land reform
appears to have been accomplished, in reality the concentrated
structureof landholdingand thenatureof agricultural organization
remained largely unchanged. Table 2 shows the shocking fact that
under1%of the farms inBrazil produceoverhalf of thegross income
in agriculture, while nearly 3million farms (66% of the total) gener-
ate just 3.27% of the gross income. The fact that so much effort and
resourceswere spent on land reformprograms over the years, with
their additional cost in terms of environmental degradation (many
settlement projects are in theAmazon), violence andhuman suffer-
ing,with limited impact on their intended objectives, reiterates our
point that policymaking in this area in Brazil is not a trivial pursuit.
With hindsight, it is apparent that direct transfers to the intended
beneﬁciaries in the style of the Bolsa Familia or similar programs,
would have probably been less wasteful and more impactful, while
reaching the same results in terms of affecting the organization of
agriculture.
The concentration of production in a few highly productive
farms side by side with a large mass of uncompetitive units, shown
in Table 2, ﬂies in the face of the massive efforts over the years
to counter this trend. Even today there is still much confusion in
government policy as to how this situation was reached and what
to do about it, apart from continuing the same type of land reform
program of the past decades based on redistributing land through
expropriationandsettlementprojects. Buainain,Alves, Silveira, and
Navarro (2013) criticize the perspective that underlies much of
current agricultural policy which classiﬁes agents as either ‘fam-
ily farms’ or ‘agribusiness’ for the purpose of policies such as credit.
The authors argue that this is an ideological and outdated view of
Brazilian agriculture, as there are both very traditional subsistence
operations as well as highly productive and modern operation that
are ofﬁcially classiﬁed as family farms. They state that this view of
agricultural policy “does nothing to modify the accelerated process
that ismaking a very large number of establishments competitively
unfeasible, that could be viable if they received support through
policies that are consistent with the actual structural changes
that Brazilian agriculture has undergone” (Buainain et al., 2013,
p. 13).
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It is not the case, as if often asserted, that the large number of
small establishments play a preponderant role in the supply of sta-
ple crops for the domestic market. This may have been the case in
the 1950s and 1960s, but ever since the production of staple crops
consumed by the rapidly increasing urban domestic markets has
originated increasingly in modern, high productivity segments of
theBrazilian agriculture. A largepart of these establishmentsdonot
produce enough for their own maintenance and rely on employ-
ment outside the farm and on programs such as the Bolsa Família
and the rural retirement program to complement their income.3
This section has shown that agricultural policy in Brazil, espe-
cially prior to 1994, has often deﬁed the intent of policymakers,
leading to inefﬁciencies and unintended consequences. The exam-
ples presented above illustrate the fact that social objectives
distorted narrowly understood agricultural policy. In the next sec-
tion we describe how both industrial and macroeconomic policies
had the same effect.
4. The evolution of agricultural policy in Brazil
4.1. Introduction
The agricultural sector in a developing country requires active
government policy to address the myriad market failures that nat-
urally hinder the sector‘s growth and development. Getting this
policy right is difﬁcult because there is a steep learning curve
that involves much trial and error in the process of discovering
what are the country‘s potentials and capabilities. But even setting
aside these natural and largely unavoidable uncertainties, agricul-
tural policy must often compete with other policy objectives for
resources and attention. In a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing
country, such as Brazil since the 1930s, this can lead to situations
where agricultural policy originally designed to promote the sec-
tor‘s growth may become distorted to favor the goals of other
policy areas. This not only undermines the performance of agri-
cultural directly, as lack of resources and distorted prices instill all
sorts of inefﬁciencies, but it also leads to frequent policy reversals
and general uncertainty. The latter undermines the conﬁdence and
security that the sector‘s participants, such as farmers, landown-
ers, workers, input producers, banks, etc.; conﬁdence and security
required to nurture activities, knowledge, and relationships that
lead to long-term growth.
In this sectionwe show that Brazilian agriculture sufferedmany
of these pathologies in the process of becoming amajor agricultural
producer in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The idea is not to present a
detailed account of the evolution of agriculture in Brazil, but rather
to explain the tortuous path from backwardness to high produc-
tivity as being largely determined by the level of uncertainty and
security engendered by the country‘s institutional setting. Brazil-
ian agriculture only achieved its dramatic transformation, realizing
the potential that had until then seemed so elusive, once the coun-
try underwent an unprecedented strengthening in its institutions
in the mid-1990s. This change generated a political and macroeco-
nomic environment where agricultural policy would no longer be
a subsidiary instrument for other policy objectives, fostering a dra-
matic reduction in the level of direct governmental interventions in
agriculture. This sharply reduced uncertainty and provided greater
safeguards for agents to make long-term investments and to fully
pursue the country‘s agricultural potential.
The analysis divides the evolution of Brazilian agriculture into
three distinct phases. The ﬁrst is the phase of horizontal expansion,
3 For a more detailed account of the traditional farming sector in Brazil and the
role of EMPBRAPA refer to Bacha and Carvalho (2014). See also Alves and Rocha
(2010).
from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the
1970s, in which the growth of agricultural production was mainly
due to the expansion of the agricultural frontier. The second is
the phase of conservative modernization, from the early 1970s to
the early 1990s in which the exhaustion of unused fertile lands in
the frontier led to a system for technical change and policies that
achieved a gradualmodernization anddiversiﬁcation of agriculture
but with high levels of concentration. Finally, a phase of low gov-
ernmental intervention began in the mid-1990s with increasing
participation of a substantially modernized and diversiﬁed agricul-
tural sector in agribusiness complexes with growing importance
in supplying domestic and international markets. The focus will be
in showing how agricultural policy was undermined by conﬂicting
policy objectives in the ﬁrst two phases, and then on the impact of
the reduction of these uncertainties in the third phase.
4.2. The phase of horizontal expansion (1946–1970)
An analysis of the performance of Brazilian agriculture in the
1st phase must consider the urban bias of the import substitution
industrialization strategy (ISI) adopted after WWII (Baer, 2008).
The agricultural sector was then identiﬁed with backwardness,
deserving attention only because of its key roles in the ISI strategy.
Accordingly, agricultural strategy and policies remained second
order. ISI resulted in a considerable transfer of income—achievedby
thedominanturban-industrial policynetwork– fromagriculture to
the urban-industrial sector (Bacha, 1975; Oliveira, 1981). This was
done chieﬂy through the manipulation of relative prices against
agriculture. In this period, foreign exchange – primarily generated
by agricultural exports, especially coffee – was consistently over-
valued. Real prices of agricultural products for thedomesticmarked
– especially those of food products – were artiﬁcially compressed,
via export restraints and by price ﬁxing by decree. In contrast,
prices of domestically produced industrial goods – the object of
considerable protection – were free to increase.
In this period Brazil didn’t have an all-inclusive agricultural pol-
icy network. TheMinistry of Agriculture, created in the early 1930s,
did not lead agricultural strategy and policy. It dealt mainly with
regulatory aspects such as plant and animal health. Policies such as
rural credit and minimum prices – virtually of no consequence in
the period – were controlled by governmental organizations of the
urban-industrial policy network with no concern with agricultural
development. This led to policies with potentially negative effects
on agriculture.
This notwithstanding, the performance of agriculture was ade-
quate; production increased enough to assure that, by and large,
the sectoral terms of trade would not negatively affect the then
very rapid pace of import substitution industrialization (foreign
exchange was essential for input and equipment imports), with
its ensuing fast boost of urban demand for food (Mueller, 2011).
In fact, regardless of a consistently overvalued foreign exchange,
agriculture originated most of the country’s export earnings. The
adequate expansion of agricultural production for the domestic
market meant that agricultural prices did not contribute towards
the inﬂationary pressures felt during this period. In addition, agri-
cultural production helped to generate unfavorable terms of trade
between the agricultural and the industrial sectors.
Summing up, most of Brazilian agriculture remained extremely
primitive during the 1st phase; yields were very low by world
standards and remained so throughout the period (Nicholls, 1970).
Policies to modernize agriculture were almost non-existent, an
exception being the efforts to advance the production of coffee, cot-
ton and sugar cane by organizations of the state government of São
Paulo, the impacts of which were mostly limited to the agriculture
of portions of that state (Pastore et al., 1976). The main policies in
this period were the road building programs (Nicholls, 1970); new
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roads enabled farmers to bring more land into cultivation, under
practically the same methods.
4.3. The period of ofﬁcially induced conservative modernization
(1965–early 1990s)
By the end of the 1st phase the availability of unoccupied fertile
lands in theagricultural frontierhaddiminishedsigniﬁcantly. There
were abundant unused lands in the Cerrado (central-Brazil’s huge
savannas and in the Amazon), but technologies for their produc-
tive exploitation had yet to be developed. Fearing problems from
an inadequate performance of agriculture, the 1964–85 military
governments began promoting conditions for a more intensive use
of land in the already settled areas and in the Cerrado portions not
too far from themainmarkets; the occupationof land in theCerrado
and Amazon frontier continued but now mostly with geopolitical
motivation (Mueller, 2012).
Thebasis of thedevelopment strategyof themilitary regimewas
to reinforce and accelerate the import substitution strategy aimed
at the transformation of the country into a modern industrial pow-
erhouse. An agricultural strategy was never central to the import
substitution model adopted, but the regime realized the strategic
role of an adequate performance of agriculture in terms of pro-
duction for the domestic market and as a vital source of foreign
exchange. However, the agricultural policies the 2nd phase saw
the consolidation of an overall agricultural policy network involv-
ing representatives of the modernizing farm segments, pressuring
increasingly for resources for credit and minimum price policies,
for investments in roads and storage capacity in rural areas, and
for the creation of new policy instruments (e.g. a rural insurance
policy), andmost of the organizations of the agricultural public sec-
tor, which were reformed and reorganized. The diversiﬁcation of
production and exports, together with the growing formation and
consolidation of agribusiness complexes led to increasing pressure
for broaderpolicies for agriculture.However, even late in theperiod
the increasingly inﬂuential agriculturalpolicynetworkwas far from
capable to easily attain the policy objectives they favored. In the
policy negotiations they had to contend with a highly inﬂuential
group: that composed by the macroeconomic techno-bureaucracy.
Regarding the agricultural sector the latter group had two some-
times conﬂicting goals: ﬁrst, to achieve a good production and
exports performance, seen as crucial to the control of inﬂation and
the generation of foreign exchange; and second to control pub-
lic expenditure. When considerations of production, supply and
exports prevailed, the agricultural policy network and the macro-
economic techno-bureaucracy tended to act in tandem. However,
when the threat to stabilization became pervasive the two policy
networks usually diverged but, in times of economic crises the con-
siderable power of the macroeconomic techno-bureaucracy led to
the restriction – and sometimes the distortion – of policies dear to
the agricultural policy network.4
With the restoration of democracy in 1985 the policy processes
began to go through some transformations but agricultural policy
did not change radically over the remainder of the 2nd phase (the
1985 - 1990 period). Brazil’s was in almost constant state ofmacro-
economic crises during this period and the protracted approval
and implementation of a new Constitution – the new charter was
approved in 1988 and went into effect in 1989 – prevented signiﬁ-
cant reforms of the policy. In fact, they came to fruition only in the
1990s, during the 3rd phase.
4 The clashes between the agricultural policy network and the macroeconomic
techno-bureaucracy in the context of the minimum price policy in the 1980s are
discussed in Mueller (1988).
The core aspects of the conservative modernization agricultural
development model of the military regime were:
• The implementation of a broad based research system for tropi-
cal agriculture – leading to the EMBRAPA system. The ﬁrst steps
towards this goal were taken at the beginning of the 2nd phase
but the emphasis on technological development of agriculture
wasmore strongly felt after the1970s.Aswenotedabove thiswas
probably the most important direct determinant of the produc-
tivity increases in the ﬁnal period (this will be further discussed
in the next section);
• The institution of a rural credit system – the National System of
Rural Credit (NSRC)–,which provided, especially along the 1970s,
abundant ﬁnancing, in very generous terms, to commercial agri-
culture. It basically aimed at promoting the use of modern inputs
(agricultural equipment, fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides),
much of which were initially imported. The ﬁnancial resources
drawn by the agricultural credit policy were far from modest.
After1970, theannual valueof loans (expressed inUS$), increased
markedly, reaching almost US$ 16 billion in 1974, and remained
above US$ 20 billion in all years of the 1975–82 period (this
period’s annual averagewas 23.1 billionUS$). The contribution of
agricultural credit to the performance of agriculture during this
period is widely recognized, although most experts considered
the policy excessive and poorly conducted.5 It was also criti-
cized for reaching only a relatively small number of previledged
large farmers; for its regional concentration in the Center-South
of Brazil, disregarding depressed areas such as the Northeast;
for focusing mostly on export commodities; for promoting rural
unemploynent by liberally ﬁnancing investment in agricultural
equipment; and – perpassing these aspects – by its effects on the
concentration of income in rural areas.
• Improvement of the administration of the minimum price pol-
icy, which became dominant in the agricultural strategy in the
1980s. Due to escalating inﬂation in the 1980s, pressures for
the control of monetary variables by international institutions,
notably the IMF, was intense. This enabled the macroecono-
mic techno-bureaucracy to successfully press for low minimum
prices, discouraging production. Conversely, in periods affected
by poor harvests of speciﬁc commodities, their price would tend
to be unusually high, coming to be seen as inﬂationary threat.
In this case, the macroeconomic techno-bureaucracy would usu-
ally press for high minimum prices for the next harvest season,
reinforcing instead of avoiding the resulting cobweb effect. As
shown by (Mueller, 1988), in the 1980s the macroeconomic
techno-bureaucracy was actually in command of the minimum
price policy.
• The provision of inducements – incentives, subsidies – for the
formation and the expansion of agribusiness complexes.
• It was assumed that, with the implementation of the above
instruments, a dynamic rural entrepreneurial classwouldemerge
and perform as expected in the agricultural modernization pro-
cess. This assumption proved correct.
• There were marked changes in the legislation governing land
reform, but which did not generate effective results. Moderniza-
tionwas to be achievedwithoutmajor changes in thedistribution
of land. It was this that branded the agricultural strategy as ‘con-
servative’.
In sum, having performed a broad reform of the agricultural
support infrastructure, the regime decided to adopt market incen-
tives instruments to assure an aceptable growth in agricultural
5 See, for instance, appraisals in da Mata (1982), Sayad (1984), and Goldin and
Rezende (1993).
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production and exports, but clashes with macroeconomic objec-
tives often undermined these efforts and generated signiﬁcant
uncertainty.
4.4. The consolidation of a modern, dynamic agricultural sector
in Brazil
One of the main factors responsible for the eventual success of
Brazilian agriculture was, undoubtedly, the expansion of the inter-
national demand for agricultural commodities which led to a long
period of quickly growing commodity prices. Nevertheless, in order
to be able to take advantage of this window of opportunity it was
crucial that an institutional environment had emerged where agri-
cultural policy correcting market failures and creating conditions
for investment, diversiﬁcation and innovation could be adopted
that was not plagued by conﬂicting objectives, reversals and unin-
tended consequences. Once this had been achieved the process of
private investment and accumulation actually required less gov-
ernment intervention than what had previously been the norm,
allowing for a greater role for free enterprise in determining fac-
tor allocation. The key institutional change took place in both the
political and economic dimensions. Politically the 1988 Constitu-
tion established a strong imperative for social inclusion, equality,
transparency and participation, which is still a major determinant
of the policymaking process in Brazil today. While this dimension
led to the establishment of a strong and stable democracy for the
ﬁrst time in Brazil, it also contributed to deepening hyperinﬂation
as this belief in inclusion sought to give all things to all people. Only
with the rise of a belief in the fundamental and imperative impor-
tance of monetary stabilization that came about with the Real Plan
in 1994,which did not displace but rather complemented the belief
in social inclusion, did the country reach the institutional environ-
ment where both economic and political stability, predictability
and inclusion would initiate an unprecedented virtuous process
of development, poverty reduction and reduction of inequalities.6
While the stabilization of the currency and the adoption of ﬁscal
disciplinewere themost obvious proximate causes of the improve-
ments of agriculture, the deeper, fundamental cause was the new
institutional setting and consequent rule of law.
Three basic constituents of the expansion and modernization
of agriculture in Brazil under this new environment will be
discussed: the formation of an effective system of technological
development; the expansion of an important class of professional,
entrepreneurial, farmers; and the constitution and expansion of a
dynamic agribusiness sector. The joint impact of change in these
three areas had a central role in the development and moderniza-
tion of Brazilian agriculture, which gathered speed along the 3rd
phase.
As indicated, early in the 2nd phase the need to raise the pro-
ductivity and modernize the Brazilian agriculture was prioritized.
This was successfully executed and major results began to be felt
towards the end of the period. The main features of the techni-
cal change system established involved the construction of the
physical infrastructure of the system (research facilities built in
central parts of the major producing regions or focusing on spe-
cial themes), the hiring and training high level personnel sorely
needed to advance the process, and the establishment of a scheme
to coordinate, manage and continuously oversee and improve the
system.
The construction of the research network involved the estab-
lishment by the federal government of a public corporation –
the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (EMBRAPA) to
6 For a detailed analysis of the change in beliefs and institutions in Brazil from
1964–2014 see Alston et al. (2016).
coordinate the process and make it advance. Today EMBRAPA is
quite large (Alves, 2010) but it is far from a centralized, monolithic
organization. Having in view the considerable geographical size
of Brazil, and the diversity of the country’s habitats and social
design, EMBRAPA was erected as a decentralized research network,
composed of different centers spread throughout the country.
There are regional organizations (such as centers for the savannas,
humid tropics and dry lands), agricultural product organizations
(such as centers for corn (maize), rice and beans, soybeans, beef
cattle, and milk), and special thematic centers (such as the centers
for genetics and for remote sensing). They were established in
different geographical areas, guided by the characteristics of the
agricultural research needs and problems. Furthermore, from the
beginning EMBRAPA endeavored to acquire the collaboration of
universities, of public institutions such as state research orga-
nizations, and of organizations of the private sector. And it also
conquered the support of international organizations.
If the typical agricultural producers of Brazil were the absentee
landlordsmotivatedchieﬂybypolitical power, as sketchedbymany
in the social sciences during the 1950s (for an interesting critical
survey see Castro (1979)), the impacts of the research effort and of
the injection of funds discussed above, would be of almost no con-
sequence as far as the development of agriculture was concerned.
However, in the south and southwest of Brazil and even in areas in
which coffee prospered such as parts of the state of São Paulo, there
was an important reserve of professional, generally full time farm-
ers, well disposed to innovate. This was vital for the modernization
that took place and which accelerated during the 2nd phase. The
availability of land in the agricultural frontier and the potential for
improvement in already cultivated lands with the use of appropri-
ate technology and served by transport infrastructure, tapped this
reserve of professional farmers. Sons of farmers and former small
landowners in the southandofotherparts ofBrazil producedwaves
of migrants which, responding to the ﬁnancial incentives lavishly
provided by the government in the 2nd phase, purchased land in
new agricultural areas. They took advantage of the new produc-
tion methods made available by the research network. Moreover,
this growing entrepreneurial reserve also started to occupy and
cultivate land in the Cerrado, the huge savannas of central Brazil.
They were encouraged not only by cheap lands, but by special gov-
ernmental regional development incentives (Mueller, 2012), and –
signiﬁcantly – by the results of the research effort by the EMBRAPA
network destined to create conditions for the productive cultiva-
tion of the acid, low natural fertile land in the Cerrado (Rezende,
2003). By the end of the 1980s, the Cerrado began to be regarded as
an important potential area of expansion of Brazil’s modern agri-
culture.
As shown by Montoya and Guilhoto (2000), by the end of the
2nd phase Brazil’s agribusiness sector as a whole was already well
established and its progress was strongly reﬂected in the more
modern segment of the Brazilian agriculture. By the end of the
1990s it was responsible for nearly a quarter of the country’s Gross
Domestic Product. As for the origin of the private enterprises that
compose the agribusiness complexes in Brazil, an important role
has been played by multinational corporations, particularly in the
production of inputs such as farm machinery and agrichemicals,
and in the transformation of agricultural commodities; but the sec-
tor has seen the rise of domestic conglomerates some of which
became multinationals, particularly in the area of meat processing.
It should be observed that, in the 2nd phase, agribusiness com-
plexes came forward encouraged by market conditions and by
incentives provided by the import substitution policies of the
period.
In sum, over the 3rd phase the impressive development and
modernization of Brazilian agriculture was the result of several
initiatives, notably technical change and the incentives for the
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expansion of an advanced agribusiness sector. It was also posi-
tively affected by the availability of entrepreneurial farmers and
of new or degraded lands in which new technologies and modern
inputs could be proﬁtably applied. As for incentives policies, their
role declined signiﬁcantly in the period. They had an important
impact in the transition stage of the 2nd phase, but later on the
government struggled to disengage itself from them, transferring
to the private sector part of the price support mechanism, and the
ﬁnancing of agricultural production. Of course, many distortions
still remain. There are considerable challenges to be addressed –
such as large investments in infrastructure – to ensure the con-
tinued development of the sector, and to prevent stagnation or
regression.
5. Conclusions
In section 2 we argued that Brazilian agriculture has undergone
an impressive transformation in the last ﬁfty years from low pro-
ductivity and backwardness to a frontrunner in the production and
export of large portfolio of products. This success has led many
other countries as well as international agencies to consider what
lessons and recommendations the Brazilian experiencemight have
for their own agricultural efforts. In particular, the Brazilian case
has been suggested as a template for many sub-Sahara African
countries given several geographical and economic similarities. In
section 4 we detailed the evolution of Brazilian agriculture over
three distinct phases in which different policies were tried and
different results achieved. The transformation proper of Brazilian
agriculture into its currentmodern anddynamic state began to take
shape in the 1990s, but the earlier periods of conservative mod-
ernization (early 1970s to early 1990) and the frontier expansion
period from World War II to the 1970s, marked the point where
things began to fall into place. The path to agricultural modernisa-
tion did not take a straight pre-planned course, but rather moved
along through trial and error, through many reversals, and was full
of surprises and unintended consequences. This history has to be
understood in the context of the country’s political economy in
which different policies necessarily redistribute rents, beneﬁts and
costs across myriad social and economic groups that try to inﬂu-
ence these policies. In this seense, the Brazilian experience cannot
be easily transplanted and emulated. Each country has its own
idiosyncratic conﬁguration of power, institutions and local circum-
stances, so that what worked in Brazil probably will have a very
different effect elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Brazilian experience
does suggest that agricultural policies work best when they reﬂect
accommodationwith various relatedmarkets. Brazilian agriculture
took off once the country had reached a politically inclusive and
economically disciplined institutional setting, allowingagricultural
policy to become less interventionist, removing many restrictions,
passing on to the private sector many tasks that these could per-
form better and concentrating on those area where market failures
remained, such as research, insurance, coordination, precautionary
stocks, etc.7 This might not make for a revolutionary policy recom-
mendation but, as the Brazilian case has shown, it is a lesson that
many governments are reluctant to recognize.
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